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Introduction 
During the first era of globalization, from the years 1870 to 1940, there was an 
unprecedented cross-border movement of goods, capital, and labor.1  The essential 
difference between today’s globalized trade and that of the first era is what happened 
as a result of World War II.  The World War II victors’ adoption of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Bretton Woods is widely characterized as a 
belated recognition by the Western powers that comparative advantage is the best 
candidate for a foundational norm of international trade.2  The classic story is one of 
failure and redemption.  Before World War II, the modern liberal democracies failed 
to recognize that liberalized trade and freer movement of goods would be a collective 
benefit.   Instead, they remained committed to protectionist policies developed in a 
prior era of mercantilism and, in the process, tore one another apart with trade wars 
that hampered their recovery from deep depressions at the time when the greatest of 
strategic dangers loomed.  In their fight over the soul of the State, the story goes, the 
modern liberal democracies failed to install an international trade order that accorded 
with their constitutional structures and their strategic interests at the time when 
fascism was making its bid for global domination.3  This strategic and economic 
mistake, however, was rectified in the redeeming act of Bretton Woods.  Although 
the U.S. Congress ultimately rejected the international financial and other aspects of 
the Bretton Woods work, comparative advantage was embraced as the foundational 
norm of trade, thereby contributing to the binding of the modern liberal democracies 
into an economically and politically cohesive alliance that withstood the Cold War 
and ultimately defeated Communism in the struggle for Statecraft dominance.4 
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 Scholarly discussion of Bretton Woods and international trade often evinces an “end 
of history” theme.5  Bretton Woods was uniquely qualified to accord with the welfare 
nation-state structure of the World War II powers, and scholars and analysts have 
mistaken this efficacious marriage of convenience with a timeless principle.  Thus, 
we are told that Bretton Woods and the GATT “embed” democracy in a unique 
fashion by bringing in the former fascist nations and providing even greater resources 
than before for each state to deliver welfare and security to its nation.  Any form of 
democracy requires that political sovereignty be retained by the people and, further, 
that all the people within the state enjoy universally recognized freedoms and 
liberties.  Comparative advantage and relative specialization contribute to the 
increase of the global economic pie, thereby making each individual nation-state 
better off to provide security for its peoples welfare and liberty.  The “negative 
integration” aspects of the GATT, which focus on the removal of barriers to trade 
through prohibitions on tariffs in excess of agreed-upon bindings, discriminatory 
taxation and regulation, quotas, and like measures, ensure in theory that each 
Contracting Party retains the legal capacity to exercise its political sovereignty to 
regulate within its borders while only giving up tools of protectionism.6  Most 
importantly, each individual state can choose the welfare mechanisms it deems best 
to serve its nation, all the while benefiting from a more efficient and plentiful 
international trade order and production.  At the end of the day, then, even while 
maintaining political sovereignty, each country is theoretically better off and has not 
given up its obligation to discharge its essential function in the 20th century – the 
welfare of its nation. 
Our claim, however, is that the 20th century system accords with the constitutional 
structure of the victors of war, and that they therefore devised it accordingly, but that 
comparative advantage is not a timeless truth.  Our claim that the key to 
understanding the global trading order, and its relationship to the strategic interests of 
its actors, lies in uncovering the relationship between trade and the State.7 A central 
aspect of this understanding is that the victors of war or states that otherwise 
dominate the strategic playing field have the opportunity to establish a trade system 
that accords with their Statecraft.8 The trade order between states is connected to a 
larger order of states, an order we identify as “constitutional.” The current trade order 
is predicated on policies and practices that were the product of a global trading order 
of nation-states. When the current trade order was conceived and implemented in the 
middle of the twentieth century, the world was comprised of nation-states. Each 
nation-state contained an infrastructure and a wealth of industries that were located in 
a place and connected to markets regulated by the states where those industries were 
found. For the nation-state, the nature of its Statecraft accorded with the trade system 
put in place at Bretton Woods, as it was in the interests of the victors of World War II 
to adopt such a system. This world, which comprised the material background for the 
institutions conceived at Bretton Woods, is not the one we live in. Yet, the policies, 
practices, and institutions of the global trading order are all predicated on this world. 
Given that the rules and institutions of trade are the product of a world that no longer 
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 exists, new norms and institutions are urgently needed.  We believe that not only 
does trade hang in the balance but global security as well.  
In Part I, we outline our argument about the relationship of Statecraft to the 
international trading order, and to the strategic goals of the states that comprise this 
order.  We illustrate our claim with a discussion of the 20th century order, reviewing 
selected historical events starting with the Treaty of Versailles and continuing 
through the fall of the Berlin Wall.  In Part II, we apply our theory to the current 
epochal manifestation of the State, and what we perceive to be the new existential 
dangers:  global networked terrorism, globalized diseases and natural disasters, and 
the rise of religious fundamentalism as a Statecraft competitor. We conclude in Part 
III with various ancillary observations as to the import of our thesis and its relevance 
to today’s international economic order and what we believe to be the need to 
overhaul it. 
 
Part I 
The State has two faces, an inner and an outer. The outer face of the State has two 
dimensions: strategy and trade. The inner face of the State is its legal, constitutional 
dimension.  The outer dimension of the State is comprised of two principal features: 
strategy and trade. At all times, states have a strategic relationship to other states, the 
most basic of which are peace and war.  Trade is the second dimension of the outer 
face of the State. Trade ideology (e.g., mercantilism or comparative advantage) 
follows the constitutional order of states in that each form of the State is 
complemented by a particular trade regime. For instance, as we will explain further, 
mercantilism was complementary to the state-nation form of the State and in the 
twentieth century comparative advantage was a natural trade ideology for the era of 
the nation-state.  “Statecraft” embodies the outer and the inner faces of the State.  
Our argument is that these two dimensions of Statecraft interact with one another 
over time, and that the trade and strategic outer faces of the State must be structured 
so as to accord with the inner dimension of Statecraft, as well as with each other.  
Thus, when we say that the trade order “follows” the constitutional order of states, 
we mean that each constitutional order of states (i.e., each epochal iteration of the 
State) embraces a complementary trade ideology, and when we argue that the trade 
order must accord with the strategic order of state we claim that the dominant group 
of states in each constitutional epoch tend to adhere to a trade order that accords with 
their strategic needs.   
Our theory posits that the inner constitutional dimension of the State, law, is directly 
linked to the outer face of the State, that the inner constitution of the State varies 
from one epochal manifestation to the next, and that the interaction between the inner 
and outer faces of the State ultimately brings about transformative patterns that over 
time usher in the next era of Statecraft.9  One upshot of this theory is that grand 
pronouncements as to the achievement of the optimal form of government, or of the 
establishment of a timeless trade order, are misguided.  Fukuyama, for example, was 
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 wrong when he declared that modern liberal democratic Statecraft portended the “end 
of history.”10  In fact, he merely took a snapshot of the modern State at its apex.11  
As we will explain, the continuous wheel of Statecraft would bring about the next 
constitutional epoch.12  Likewise, the classic account that comparative advantage 
ultimately prevailed over misguided policies of mercantilism and protectionism to 
bring about an international trade order that accords with democracy, also has a 
flavor of timelessness that misses the historical mechanisms that makes comparative 
advantage a legitimate foundational norm for the modern nation-state epoch, but not 
necessarily for other constitutional eras.13  In this part of the paper, we illustrate our 
theory with a description of the relationship between the inner and outer faces of the 
State in the 20th century welfare nation-state epoch.14   
In the modern epoch, the State legitimated itself by delivering on its promises of 
security and welfare to the nation.15  On the strategic front, the 20th century featured 
a series of conflicts that were intended to settle the question of which competing 
forms of Statecraft -- communism, fascism or democracy -- would become the 
dominant mode of Statecraft in relation to the nation.  The Bretton Woods Order was 
uniquely suited for the modern liberal democracies.  Modern era Statecraft included a 
wide array of legal and policy schemes that embodied the modern liberal democratic 
State’s commitment to unleash its power to provide for the welfare of the nation.16  
The State achieved its goal through the legal implementation of an organic set of 
principles in subject matter areas such as public enterprises, unemployment 
compensation, housing aid, assistance to large families, and other policies intended to 
achieve the chosen level of redistributive justice.  The State established property and 
economic rights available generally to the nation. It provided for labor protection 
rules that shored up its working classes. It regulated resource conservation, consumer 
rights, sales and offerings of securities, competition law, and a myriad of other areas 
that were relevant to the economic and social life of the nation. 
The modern liberal democracies had, of course, differing approaches to the relevant 
regulatory issues.17 From minute regulation, such as pesticide levels or machinery 
technical specifications, to broad constitutional areas such as expropriation, free 
speech, or the right of discrete minorities, the modern liberal democratic states 
adopted disparate approaches to specific subject matter areas. The European states 
tended to adhere to cradle-to-grave entitlements.  In the United States, the emphasis 
was more on tax and transfer policies. Japan, for its part, relied heavily on centralized 
planning of industrial activity and subsidies of research and development that would 
shore up enterprises housing a large part of the domestic workforce.  Despite their 
different viewpoints, all major players shared a basic philosophy of domestic 
Statecraft:  the dedication of the power of the State to secure, as a matter of 
entitlement, the welfare of the nation.18   
The Bretton Woods Order operated in harmony with domestic Statecraft because it 
joined an efficient economic theory with a legal structure that respected each modern 
liberal democratic state’s welfare choice.19  When the United States, Britain, and 
France met at Bretton Woods, their aspiration was to produce a new global economic 
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 order that would bring financial stability and promote economic growth through free 
trade.  The protectionist policies of the 1930s and the pre-War era had hampered the 
democracies in their struggle against fascism.20  At the very time when they needed 
an economically strong and cohesive bloc to wage their existential war against 
fascism, the modern liberal democracies followed 19th century of mercantilism that 
resulted in trade wars and fragmentation.21   Redemption happened after World War 
II, in large part, because the GATT embodied the theories of absolute and 
comparative advantage developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo.22 States 
would maximize their collective wealth by eliminating restrictions on the free 
movement of goods.23  They would tend to specialize in commercial sectors where 
they held an absolute or relative competitive edge, and satisfy their domestic demand 
through trade rather than the concentration of all or substantially all production in 
domestic hands.24  The upshot of this economic principle was the maximization of 
collective resources, and the expansion of the collect 25ive pie.  
However, the deeper and more meaningful accomplishment of the GATT was that it 
institutionalized a set of legal norms that unleashed comparative advantage as the 
driver of the international economic order, all the while operating harmoniously with 
the domestic legal Statecraft order of the day.  The institutionalization of comparative 
advantage featured principally three “disciplines”, each of which imposing negative 
obligations on the participating states, that reduced those states’ ability to impose 
protectionist trade barriers: (1) a prohibition against the adoption of tariffs exceeding 
agreed upon bindings; (2) a non-discrimination norm applicable to internal taxation 
and regulation; and (3) a prohibition of quotas and like measures.26 The Bretton 
Woods “negative integration order” was uniquely suited for the modern liberal 
democracies because, at least in theory, it left them war free to implement their 
individual legal and policy schemes to ensure the welfare of the nation.27  The 
welfare policies, regardless of their form, could be implemented without interference 
from the international set of norms regulating trade.28  Despite their different 
systems, all modern liberal democracies shared a basic philosophy of domestic 
Statecraft:  the dedication of the power of the State to secure, as a matter of 
entitlement, the welfare of the nation.  Bretton Woods worked and, as John Maynard 
Keynes famously put it, the lawyers were its “poets” because they institutionalized a 
trade order that, at least in theory, would respect the sovereign national right of each 
participating state to achieve welfare through the regulatory route of its choosing.29   
The Bretton Woods system, in other words, married international economic policies 
(and an international order of states dedicated to wealth maximization) to a legal 
framework that protected the nation-states’ power to control their domestic 
economies.  Thus, the GATT created a world trade system that accorded with the 
domestic expressions of the constitutional nature of modern Statecraft.30 The 
application of mercantilist policies to a modern epoch was bound to produce 
economically disastrous results not because mercantilism was an inadequate norm in 
the absolute, but because it did not accord with the nature of Statecraft of the time. 
The transformed State of the 20th century had to adjust its outer trade expression and 
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 articulate a modern structure that would accord with the inner face of Statecraft and 
its expression in the strategic realm. 
Bretton Woods also accorded with the strategic needs of the World War II victors 
because its structure worked harmoniously with the security model of the modern 
nation-states. The strategic essentials of the modern era of Statecraft included 
sovereignty and balance of powers.  Each individual member of the Western alliance 
held the sovereignty of the territory defining the nation as a fundamental hallmark of 
its security policy, and the system created a bloc of states of sufficient strength to 
defend itself individually and, as a group, to ward off communism as the second 
competing theory of Statecraft.31  (Germany and Japan were of course militarily 
restricted, but their alliance with the United States essentially gave them the strength 
to repel foreign invaders that would threaten their post-fascist constitutional order.)  
Balance of powers in the strategic realm was matched by the trade balance of powers, 
with each state trading on its comparative advantage and solid economic base 
associated with the nation (and in the case of the defeated fascist powers 
strengthened through the Marshall Plan).32  At the same time, balance of powers was 
achieved consistently with a cohesive economic bloc bound by free trade but 
sovereign to regulate.  At the end of the day, as they prepared to fight communism as 
a Statecraft competitor, the modern liberal democracies joined themselves into a 
balanced whole that was stronger than its individual components, infused additional 
resources to each such individual component and, as structured, did not infringe on 
their essential sovereign constitutional features. 
A predominant feature of the victors of World War II was their concern with their 
individual vulnerability to the Soviet bloc’s competing model of statecraft.  The 
victors found themselves at a cross-road.  In order to maintain their position they 
could not allow history to repeat itself.  Economically punishing former fascist 
nations would only serve to make communism more attractive.  The only alternative 
was creating a unified Western bloc based on modern liberal democracy that not only 
brought former fascist nations into the fold but provided greater resources for each 
state to deliver welfare and security to its nation.33  This was the best structure for the 
victors of war to provide a strategic and trade alternative to the Soviet bloc.  This 
understanding was the most appropriate economic complement to the Western 
military alliance in that the international trade order cemented economically the 
strategic alliance.  The modern liberal democracies were able to unleash the welfare 
regulatory system as a viable alternative to the communist, centralized economy, all 
the while achieving a well-balanced alliance of collective strength to ward off the 
Soviet bloc.   
The victors of World War II necessarily had to evolve away from the mercantilist 
system of the 19th century state-nation, not because the foundational principles of that 
system were inconsistent with a timeless economic truth, but because the 
continuation of mercantilism would have rendered the victorious states to become 
fragmented and serve to undermine their ability to unleash its welfare regulation in a 
harmonious international environment.  Mercantilism might have been the 
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 appropriate norm in the 19th century state-nation form of Statecraft, where the State 
dedicated itself to strengthening its power.34  
 
Part II 
The Bretton Woods system brought about changes in the inner constitution and 
Statecraft of the victors of World War II and other emerging players in the 
international scene that makes it necessary to revisit the fundamentals of the 
international trade system.   
First, the subdivision of the world into economic units coextensive with nation-states 
was eroded because the GATT and the WTO opened up borders to trade in goods and 
services. This openness lies at the heart of comparative advantage. In such a 
marketplace, goods and services are exchanged across borders by consumers, 
distributors, and manufacturers. Manufacturers will purchase components necessary 
for their output, and distributors will purchase products for domestic resale (in 
particular from jurisdictions that enjoy a regulatory comparative advantage).35 
Importers will inevitably seek to acquire equity or other stakes in their suppliers, so 
as to increase profit margins. Conversely, exporters will seek to participate in the 
profits of the importing companies. Joint ventures and other cross-border 
partnerships will flourish. The upshot is that the trading world that grew out of the 
Bretton Woods system gradually “flattened” the economic units that formed the core 
of that system (the nation-states). 
This outward expansion of market activities and of market integration was directly 
related to the adoption of comparative advantage as the animating norm of the 
system. In the mercantilist era, the inward solidification process led to the creation of 
a national industrial context that set the stage for comparative advantage. In the 
comparative advantage era, the gradual relocation of factors of production to the 
countries with the most comparative advantage created relationships that were bound 
to yield a diffuse world. 
The textiles industry provides a clear example of the phenomenon. The principal 
players in the industry include manufacturers, designers, brand owners, distributors, 
and retailers. At the beginning of the comparative advantage era, all of these actors 
were associated with one nation and national industries were identified with 
geographically located nation-states (by way of example, Paris’ Sentier or New 
York’s Garment District).36  The model was national in character. The Sentier 
merchants presented their wares to retailers and wholesalers. Designers worked in the 
back office to produce the models for each season. Manufacturers were located in the 
neighborhood, together with producers of cloth, buttons, zippers, hardware, fabric, 
and other raw and intermediate materials needed to make the goods at issue. The 
factories with which they worked were located in regions of France traditionally 
devoted to the production of textiles, leather, and other fashion goods. 
Free trade gradually changed the rules of the game.37 Although the reduction of 
textiles and leather tariffs was by no means a smooth or complete process, and other 
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 barriers to trade faced the industry, comparative advantage resulted in the gradual 
shift of manufacturing to the Far East.  The phenomenon was manifold. First, 
companies having sufficient volume to outsource production shifted away from 
domestic manufacturers to Tunisia, Portugal, or other North African and Southern 
European countries. They then moved to the Far East countries affording at the time 
the most comparative advantage by way of cheaper labor and less restrictive 
regulation, taking into account other factors such as expertise and skills, customs 
duties, transportation costs, and other considerations relevant to the ultimate pricing 
of the product. The domestic industry in France, for instance, went through a first 
stage of transformation with the gradual elimination of domestic production. 
Companies remaining in France did so in order to make a statement, in the face of the 
unchallenged economic logic of moving manufacturing abroad. At the same time, 
comparative advantage brought about the gradual displacement of companies that 
could not afford to compete with those products or the manufacture by French 
companies abroad or the sale in France by foreign companies.38  
After a half century of GATT/WTO, the French, American and other fashion 
industries became cross-border enterprises dissociated from the nation and state in 
which their respective components sit and comprised of partnerships between 
domestic creators and sellers, and foreign manufacturing companies. The next stage 
of the commercial evolution came naturally, with French and American economic 
actors in the textiles industry reaching out to take advantage of the comparative 
advantage enjoyed by foreign manufacturers. First, sellers and distributors began to 
take equity stakes in their manufacturers. As volume increased, manufacturers found 
it necessary to expand their operations. Establishing a new factory requires cash and 
a commitment from the buyer to agree to long-term supply contracts. The buyer, in 
return for its commitment or a possible capital infusion, wanted to participate in the 
profits generated by the manufacturer. A joint venture was created, whereby 
manufacturer and distributors essentially integrate their enterprises vertically across 
borders. 
At the next stage of evolution, manufacturing companies naturally sought to expand 
their activities beyond production of goods. They invested a part of their profits to 
acquire stakes in their customers. The design expertise that first remained in the 
country of import slowly shifted to the country of export. In turn, this created an 
incentive for Western companies to partner up with Chinese 
manufacturers/wholesalers, pooling resources such as privileged access to American 
buyers working in large department stores or chains, to create profitable joint 
ventures. At the bottom, interloping ownership, the spread of production units across 
nation-state borders, and the cross fertilization of enterprises contributed to the 
replacement of national products with global, diffuse goods.  
This phenomenon, we submit, was the inevitable outcome of the GATT and Bretton 
Woods and its logic of comparative advantage.39 The world transformed itself from a 
compact of economic units associated with the states that comprised the trading 
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 world, into a global trading mass joined across borders by commercial and corporate 
links.  In turn, the transformative mechanisms engendered by the GATT changed the 
inner nature of Statecraft in such a fundamental way as to usher in an epochal 
manifestation, which has been referred to as “post-modern” or “market-state” era.  
The change in inner Statecraft does not adequately quell the upsurge of global 
networked terrorism, globalized diseases and natural disasters, and the rise of 
religious fundamentalism as a Statecraft competitor.  Therefore, the change in inner 
Statecraft requires that the international trade order be rethought and that its 
foundational norm be adjusted. 
The diffuseness of the transformed world also brought about a gradual 
commodification of the fundamental policy tools of economic regulation and wealth 
transfer, which were and are increasingly influenced by international, diffuse markets 
and correlatively escaping control by domestic regulators.40 Monetary policy, for 
example, is gradually escaping control by states.  Public debt is increasingly held by 
foreign actors and affected more by the interplay of commercial interests than by 
domestic policy choices.41 A simplified and simplistic example is the relationship 
between the United States and Japan.42 The United States has for a long time been a 
main purchaser of Japanese goods, and Japan a main purchaser of U.S. debt. The 
same situation obtains with respect to China and the United States dollars.43  China 
holds a staggering amount of U.S. dollars, and its currency has been pegged to the 
dollar.  Its willingness to continue to hold the U.S. dollar and avert a precipitous 
further decline of that currency is due in part to the fact that Chinese goods are priced 
in U.S. dollars.44  Over time this phenomenon may extend to new actors on the 
international scene, with a resulting decrease in domestic control.45 
Concurrent with these phenomena, the balance of powers that characterized the 
modern world, which was centered on the modern liberal democracies of Europe, the 
United States, and Japan, is eroding. As a result of the global marketplace wrought 
by Bretton Woods, the twenty-first century has inherited a multi-polar economic 
world resting on a global middle class spread across the North and the South, Brazil, 
India, China, and South Korea, to cite a few, who have increasingly become world 
economic centers. Developing countries have achieved growing importance in the 
world markets and gradually eroded the dominant market share of the developed 
countries.46 The old Second World, made up of communist countries, is being 
replaced by a new Second World comprised of economies formerly classified under 
the global heading of “developing countries.”47  Lying within and alongside the first 
(post-modern) and second (modern) economies are pre-modern collectives of people 
that lack the education, infrastructure, and other conditions to benefit from the 
liberalization of trade that the WTO brought about. These collectives may be 
Brazilian shantytowns, Afghan mountain towns, or the “excluded” neighborhoods 
surrounding Paris.48 The bottom line, though, is that the main interlocutors of trade 
are no longer national middle classes represented by their states.49 Rather, the trading 
world is comprised of a diffuse trading class, numbering some 800 million people 
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 and spreading out in a multi-polar economic configuration, which is surrounded by 
those who have yet to become meaningful participants in the global marketplace. 
These changes in the nature of Statecraft and in the strategic concerns of the day 
(which we will discuss in greater depth in Part III) necessitate a rethinking of the 
international trade order and the adoption of norms. 
 
Part III 
 
Today, as in the Bretton Woods era, the world must introduce a new constitutional 
norm for the international trading order.50 In Bretton Woods, the trading partners 
ushered in comparative advantage, a norm that accorded with the hallmarks of 
modern Statecraft. At the time, as we have explained, the principal trading partners 
had graduated to the modern era of Statecraft. They needed to institutionalize 
comparative advantage in order to bring the world trade system in line with the 
modern constitutional principles of sovereignty, balance of powers, nation-state, and 
welfare. Today, the decline of welfare in countries like France, Japan, and Mexico, 
the “flattening” of the world, and the other hallmarks of postmodern Statecraft that 
we have identified, require that the world install institutions designed to give life to 
the new animating norm of the trading system.  Further, the entry on the international 
scene of states that have not traversed the modern era of the welfare nation-state 
contributes to the growing obsolescence of comparative advantage as the central 
international trade norm. 
We identify the new international norm that we believe is needed as the “global 
enablement of economic opportunity,” and we believe that a new institution 
dedicated to unleashing and giving concrete expression to this norm is needed.51  We 
call this organization the “Trade Council”, and we believe that its membership should 
include representatives from the principal trading nations as well as from industry 
and other private interests with a stake in any of the given projects that the Trade 
Council would undertake.  
The Trade Council will radically shift the paradigm for infusing capital into the pre-
modern pockets of the post-modern world. Instead of relying on the regulation of 
foreign private enterprises by the domestic host states, the Trade Council will adopt a 
two-prong approach to making capital available to the excluded classes. First, the 
Trade Council will put into place a new Marshall Plan. This Plan will include a 
financial institutional framework for making financial instruments adapted to the 
circumstances of a given region available to small entrepreneurs.52 Unlike the 
Marshall Plan, which featured a one time massive investment into the destroyed 
economies of a war torn Europe, the New Marshall Plan will include gradual 
extension, on a microeconomic level, of capital resources to entrepreneurs.53 
The Trade Council will act as an umbrella organization, presiding over a network of 
institutions that could be used to make these financial instruments available, and for 
establishing the related infrastructure that we describe. These institutions will 
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 include, first, regional banks that will be funded by the member states of the Trade 
Council. The Trade Council will also work with private interests and domestic states 
to create a system of domestic incentives for companies to establish what may be 
conceptualized as “social contracts” in the pre-modern and modern pockets of the 
post-modern world.54 These social contracts will be entered into with respect to both 
the excluded classes and the vulnerable middle classes. Their goal will be to 
incentivize foreign enterprises to achieve the same type of performance requirements 
that host jurisdictions tried to impose on them. Thus, where regulation by national 
officials has failed (as in the case of Mexico having regulations against corporations 
like Honeywell exploiting its workers but does nothing to enforce it in the 
maquiladoras), incentives might win by encouraging those officials to enforce the 
regulations that are already in place. 
The incentives-based partnership among the Trade Council, states, and private 
enterprises will include the use of tax and other regulatory incentives by the home 
states of the foreign investor. This package of incentives would be made available to 
enterprises that achieve the performance goals defined by the Trade Council.55 By 
way of example, the Trade Council may set as one of its goals the expansion of the 
free trade zones recently established in Jordan and Egypt. These zones feature the 
establishment of industrial facilities for European and American companies, which 
can then export their products to the home country with an extremely low tariff 
treatment. These zones extend economic opportunity (for the people of Egypt and 
Jordan, and well as the nations themselves) to areas of the world that, as discussed 
above, are of extreme strategic importance in an era of high oil prices and 
transportation costs.56 
The passage into the post-modern epoch, however, renders the system of tariffs 
insufficient to incentivize companies to move to free trade zones that are strategically 
located. Post-modern diffuseness, together with the virtual elimination of tariffs 
during the modern era, has two consequences for projects like free trade zones. First, 
manufacturing shifts rapidly to states that offer the most welcoming regulatory and 
labor environments. Second, the virtual elimination of tariffs renders the very 
concept of “free trade zones” much less powerful than it was in the modern era. 
When tariffs averaged 50 percent of the landed cost of a product, establishing a free 
trade zone carried a strong likelihood of attracting a meaningful amount of business. 
With tariffs averaging less than 5 percent, however, enterprises are much more 
interested in locating a jurisdiction that provides skilled labor at a relatively low 
wage, such as China or India, rather than flocking to states that offer slightly lower 
tariffs, but that cannot compete with the regulatory comparative advantage of the 
powerhouses of the post-modern age. 
In addition, without the system of incentives that we are advocating, free trade zones 
suffer from the same ailments as the international investment system of the modern 
age. Even if enterprises establish factories in the free trade zones, the host states do 
not gain much economic development beyond the temporary employment of workers 
at relatively low wages.57  Enterprises will not accept a system that forces them to 
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 confer on the domestic economy benefits that go beyond those attendant to the 
operation of a factory in the most cost effective way.58  
Instead of relying on domestic regulation, the post-modern system will motivate 
enterprises to move to strategically desirable locations through a system of incentives 
established by the home jurisdiction of the investor enterprise.59 This system of 
incentives may include tax breaks, subsidies, and other benefits that may be used by 
the “exporting jurisdiction” to entice its enterprises to move to free trade zones.60  In 
other words, if the United States wants its companies to move to the Egyptian free 
trade zone, and to have a meaningful impact in relation to the enablement of global 
economic opportunity, it must also act domestically rather than rely solely on the 
mechanics of tariff reduction and the Egyptian government’s ability to regulate.61 
The strategic interest of the United States in such a system is clear, and in keeping 
with post-modern Statecraft the structural framework will include a partnership 
among an international organization, domestic states, and private concerns. 
The social contract, in this instance, could involve a promise by the enterprise to use 
local suppliers to manufacture a meaningful part of its product. It could also include a 
commitment to acquire stakes in local companies, and to give them privileged status 
as suppliers to the home market of the investor enterprise. Likewise, the investor 
enterprise could commit to take on a specified amount of higher-level employees. 
Instead of primarily using local workers for unskilled jobs and “Western” workers for 
skilled undertakings, the enterprise could train and equip the local workforce with the 
skills necessary to establish businesses of their own and compete in the post-modern 
global market. 
This structure would go hand-in-hand with the network of banks that we advocate. 
Entrepreneurship and economic opportunity might arise among the excluded classes 
on account of the system of incentives created by the Trade Council and its partners. 
An Egyptian company making zippers or other garment hardware might, for 
example, acquire the skills and network necessary to compete meaningfully in the 
United States. That enterprise could apply for a loan from a regional bank working 
with the Trade Council to build the infrastructure necessary to produce its goods in 
greater quantity and compete more meaningfully in the post-modern global markets. 
The enablement of economic opportunity would come from the junction of two 
separate, eminently post-modern programs, under the aegis of the Trade Council.  
The social contract and incentives structure would also extend to solving the problem 
of the vulnerable middle classes.62 The social contract, in this context, would provide 
incentives to companies in return for action that fosters the economic opportunities 
for the vulnerable middle classes.  
The next area of activities for the Trade Council relates to the establishment of 
infrastructures for the pre-modern pockets of the post-modern world, and of 
collaboration with other post-modern organizations to address the externalities 
engendered by the passage from the modern to post-modern age. Let us start with the 
second category of work, which will also be relevant to our discussion of 
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 infrastructures. As discussed previously, the globalization of economic activities has 
resulted in a large number of externalities, which no single state has the capacity to 
regulate and which international organizations alone cannot eliminate. Environmental 
protection and resource conservation are classic examples of this phenomenon.63 As 
is well known, the explosion of economic activities in the post-modern age has 
created thorny questions of environmental protection.64 The externalities created by 
globalized and intensified industrial activities span several discrete subject matter 
areas, which have become household names throughout the world. Global warming, 
acid rain, destruction of rain forests, multiplication of the number of endangered 
species, are all examples of the type of environmental dangers that were born out of 
the modern era and have become post-modern mainstays.65 
The incentives-based approach to tackling these global problems would go hand-in-
hand with international efforts to build infrastructure necessary to assist the pre-
modern regions of the post-modern age to compete more meaningfully in global 
markets. The New Marshall Plan that we advocate would include, in addition to the 
financial instruments system described earlier, investment in the infrastructure of 
strategically-designated states.66 In turn, these states would be asked to comply with 
internationally-defined goals in order to avail themselves of the economic packages. 
The Trade Council would coordinate among the Western states, which would pool 
resources to fund the projects, the host states, and regional organizations such as the 
Organization of African States. 
 
Conclusion 
Together with strategy, trade constitutes the outer face of the State.  Taken together, 
strategy and trade constitute Statecraft, the structure of which evolves over time and 
serves as the legitimating ethos of the State vis-à-vis the nation.  In each era of 
Statecraft, the State has faced existential challenges that call into question its ability 
to discharge its obligations to the nation in its quest for legitimacy.  In this paper, we 
have outlined how the elements that comprise the outer face of the State interact and 
evolve with one another over time against the backdrop of unfolding historical 
events.  Trade plays a significant role in the ongoing legitimization of the State and in 
meeting the ever-changing strategic needs of the State.  We believe the present 
moment is one that calls for a rethinking of Statecraft for the age of postmodern 
states.  The challenges are many but so, too, are the opportunities. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. Frieden (2006) at 13-18. 
2.   See Barton et al. (2006) at 12: “The main purpose of the GATT was to lower 
trade barriers at the border: tariffs, quotas, countervailing duties, antidumping 
duties, safeguards measures, together with their administration.” 
 
3.  We use the word “state” in two different senses. When we write “State,” we 
are referring to the conceptual political entity that has evolved in the Western 
world over roughly the last five hundred years. See McClelland (1996) at 280 
(dating the birth of the modern state at 1500). The State is manifested in many 
territorially and politically distinct “states,” like Italy or the Republic of 
Latvia. When we refer to these individual states, we refer to them as a “state.” 
For discussion of the various phases of the State’s development, and their 
relation to a variety of constitutional orders, see Bobbitt (2002) at 69–347. 
 
4.   According to Fukuyama, the liberal democratic model soundly beat fascism 
and communism because, simply put, it was a better idea. The liberal 
democratic model had no problem besting the fascist ideology of 
expansionism and racial superiority. In time, it defeated the Marxist ideology 
– in part because the growth of a strong and expansive middle class, resulting 
from (among other factors) the welfare policies of the nation state – as it had 
radically changed the social reality in which Marx wrote. In the end, 
Fukuyama argued, all good government would be organized along the lines of 
the liberal democratic model, which would be applied to govern an ethnic or 
otherwise discrete nation and would protect the rights of minorities. See 
Fukuyama (1989) at 3–18. 
 
5.  Fukuyama (Summer 1989) at 3. As he had for so many intellectuals of his 
generation, Fukuyama’s Hegel came by way of Alexandre Kojeve. See 
Kojeve (1969). For a general discussion, see Drury (1994) at 179–98. 
 
6.  As Professor Weiler has pointed out, the GATT’s economic ethos largely 
resulted from the creation of professional trade elite. This elite created a set of 
norms intended to project the impression that the GATT was grounded in 
“economic science” and insulated from crass politics: 
 
A dominant feature of GATT was its self-referential and even communitarian 
ethos explicable in constructivist terms. GATT successfully managed relative 
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insulation from the “outside” world of international relations, and it 
established among its practitioners a closely knit environment revolving 
around shared normative values (of free trade) and shared institutional 
ambitions. GATT operatives became a classical “network” of first-name 
contacts and friendly relationships. 
 
        Weiler (2002) at 336–337. 
 
7.  On the “State” See Patterson and Afilalo (2008) at Chapter 2.  The “State” is 
an enduring entity that has gone through a series of metamorphoses we 
identify as “constitutional” in nature. Simply stated, while there are certainly 
different types of states in the world at any given time, the principal states of 
the trading regime all exemplify the same structure. The nation-state is a 
prime example of an important but by no means timeless form of the State. 
 
8. We make no claim for the “necessity” of the story we tell. That is, we take no 
position on the question whether the history of global trade could have been 
different. We prescind from this discussion for two reasons. First, matters of 
explanatory historiography are very controversial. It itself, this is not a reason 
to refrain from taking a position. But the second reason leads us to believe 
that ours is the wiser course. The reason is quite simple: we do not need to 
take a position. Whether or not past events are in any sense “determined,” we 
believe that we can see how the New global trading order requires the sort of 
analysis we offer in this book. We can make our argument without taking a 
position on the question of historical necessity. Thus, we tell our story 
without reference to a controversial historiography. 
 
9. Cooper writes: “The kind of world we have depends on the kind of states that 
compose it: for the pre-modern world, success is empire and failure is chaos. 
For the modern, success entails managing the balance of power and failure 
means falling back into war or empire. For the postmodern state, success 
means openness and transnational cooperation.” Cooper (2003) at 76. 
 
10.  Fukuyama has continued to massage his initial claim. Recently he had this to 
say: 
 
The End of History was never linked to a specifically American model of 
social or political organization. Following Alexandre Kojeve, the Russian-
French philosopher who inspired my original argument, I believe that the 
European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look like at the 
end of history than the contemporary United States. The EU’s attempt to 
transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a 
transnational rule of law is much more in line with a “post-historical” world 
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than the Americans’ continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their 
military.  Francis Fukuyama, “The History at the End of History,”  
http://www.project syndicate.org/commentary/fukuyama3/English. 
 
11.  According to Fukuyama, the liberal democratic model soundly beat fascism 
and communism because, simply put, it was a better idea. The liberal 
democratic model had no problem besting the fascist ideology of 
expansionism and racial superiority. In time, it defeated the Marxist ideology 
– in part because the growth of a strong and expansive middle class, resulting 
from (among other factors) the welfare policies of the nation state – as it had 
radically changed the social reality in which Marx wrote. In the end, 
Fukuyama argued, all good government would be organized along the lines of 
the liberal democratic model, which would be applied to govern an ethnic or 
otherwise discrete nation and would protect the rights of minorities. See 
Fukuyama (1989) at 3–18. 
 
12.  The literature on the question of the State is vast. Not surprisingly, there 
exists a wide range of opinion on the question whether the State is dying, in a 
process of change, or neither. For discussion of the literature and the full 
range of opinions, see Levy (2006a). 
 
13.  Some see the “end” of the State marked by a transition to other, more 
complicated organizing forms. See Van Creveld (1999) at vii (“Globally 
speaking, the international system is moving away from an assembly of 
distinct, territorial, sovereign, legally equal states toward different, more 
hierarchical, and in many ways more complicated structures.”). See also 
Slaughter (2004) at 32 (“The conception of the unitary state is a fiction.”). 
 
14.  On the origin of the phrase “welfare state,” see Johnson (2005): 
 
The phrase “welfare state” is one that emerged after the Second World War, 
and was first used to describe the complex of social policies enacted under the 
Labour government in Britain after 1945. From Britain, “the phrase made its 
way around the world.” The welfare state possesses a unique institutional 
structure for the administration of social policy. In Weberian terms, the 
development of the welfare state may be linked to the process of 
rationalization, and the development of bureaucratic authority and the 
emergence of social clients. The expansion of the services provided by the 
welfare state in the twentieth century to cover a widening range of risks has 
also been described as a “general phenomenon of modernization”. The 
growth of the number and kinds of social services provided by the state was a 
function of its ability to create procedures defining social policy, raise the 
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funds (through taxation and contributions) to pay for these policies, identify 
recipients and distribute benefits and services. The welfare state may thus be  
conceived as a very advanced and developed state apparatus, functioning in  
political space that recognized its legitimacy, and in an economic space 
provided the means of paying for its output. 
 
        Ibid at 5. 
 
15.  The classic citation remains Weber’s essay “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gerth 
and Mills (1958). 
 
16.  See, e.g., http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm dr 05.htm;. 
“The System of Bretton Woods” at 12, available 
http://www.ww.unimagdeburg.de/fwwdeka/student/arbeiten/006.pdf. 
 
17.  Cooper (2003) at 20 remarks: “National identities are usually created by 
states out of the raw material of history, culture and language.” 
 
18.  The logic of the GATT/WTO order is that welfare and distributional policies 
were left to individual nation-states as a matter of political ideology 
(embedded liberalism). The differences between European-style welfare and 
the Japanese approach are discussed, inter alia, in Est´evez-Abe (2002) at 
158. She writes: 
 
The Japanese case also shows how different institutional designs of welfare 
states produce different problems. Continental European countries use 
welfare programs to reduce labor supply. Germany, for example, uses old age 
pensions to encourage older workers to leave the labor force. Likewise, the 
Netherlands – at least until the recent reforms – used disability benefits for 
the same purpose. Japan did not use pensions, unemployment, or disability 
benefits as means to control labor supply, and thus what prompted welfare 
reforms in Japan was not the problem of Welfare without Work. 
Instead, by the end of the 1980s, Japanese policymakers were aware of three 
major problems: (1) the growing cost of benefits/services for the elderly; (2) 
rising inequity in cost allocation; and (3) skewed access to social services. In 
all cases, the problems resulted from a gap between those paying for welfare 
services/benefits and those receiving them, a gap embedded in the 
institutional structure of the welfare state. 
       
       Ibid. 
 
19.  Kent Jones describes these institutions in their historical context in Jones 
(2004): Near the end of World War II, in 1944, representatives of the Allied 
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powers met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss the future of world 
economic relations. The hope was to develop international economic 
institutions that would promote prosperity and peace in alignment with the 
foreign policy goals of the victorious Allies. As part of that plan, the Bretton 
Woods meeting led eventually to the establishment of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
 
       Ibid at 68. 
 
20.  When he wedded balance of power to the idea of “containment,” George 
Kennan authored the US approach to the cold War. See Kennan (X) (July 
1947) at 566–82. 
 
 
21.  Alvarez and Howse (2002): A paramount goal is the avoidance of a 
protectionist summum malum – the situation where domestic social or 
economic pressures lead some states to increase or reinstate barriers to trade,   
thus triggering a competitive reaction in kind by other states, and eventually a 
“race to the bottom” that is disastrous for the global economy. This sort of 
behavior was widely perceived by the founders of the Bretton Woods system 
to have led eventually to perilous instability in the interstate system and 
economic catastrophe in the interwar years – which phenomena were seen as 
having contributed to the climate that made fascism, and the Second World 
War itself, possible. 
       
       Ibid at 94–95. 
 
22.  See Bagwell and Staiger (2000). It was Smith who, in The Wealth of Nations, 
married the private interests of individual agents to a theory of political 
economy. Smith’s insight, of course, was that the pursuit of individual interest 
would collectively result in a stronger State because market efficiency would 
engender greater economic activity which devolved to the benefit of the State   
through taxation. Ricardo, in 1817, took Smith’s insight and expanded the 
idea to foreign trade. Free trade, grounded in the theory of comparative 
advantage, would result in greater wealth for all nations. See Ricardo (1817). 
 
23.  Molle (2001) at Chapters 7 and 8, provides a thorough and accessible account 
of the economic theory underlying the formation of common market, 
including free trade areas, customs unions and more integrated constitutional 
forms of union. 
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24.  See Alvarez and Howse (2002). The postwar trade and financial order was 
therefore mainly designed to enable states to manage 
their domestic economies, in a manner consistent with political and social 
stability and justice, without the risk of setting off a protectionist race to the 
bottom. States obligated themselves not to impose quotas or related import 
restrictions, of the sort strongly associated with the race to the bottom of the 
interwar years. On the other hand, they were not required to eliminate or 
reduce their import tariffs. The legal structure of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed to facilitate such concessions and 
make them binding, but it did not require them. 
 
        Ibid at 95. 
 
25.  But see Sassen (2006): “[T]he early Bretton Woods system aimed at 
 protecting national economies from external forces, not at opening them up.” 
 
26.  This removal of barriers to trade spurned a sharp increase in cross-border 
economic activities among nation-states over the second half of the twentieth 
century. The GATT took off with 23 Contracting Parties, and gradually took 
hold in over 150 nations.  It progressively expanded to new subject matter 
areas, such as intellectual property and trade in services. These developments 
are, in retrospect what grant Bretton Woods its status as a constitutional 
moment. 
 
27.  This list illustrates the broad category of “welfare” which we discussed in 
previous chapters. Of course, a key feature of the society of nation-states is 
the fact that development of a particular welfare scheme was left to individual 
states, thereby respecting the sovereignty of nations. In the post-modern era, 
this emphasis will change as the conception of sovereignty evolves (see 
Cooper (2003) on this) and the society of states comes to realize the trans-
national nature of certain problems such as SARS, AIDS, and global 
warming. 
 
28.  See Est´evez-Abe (2002). 
 
29.  Alvarez and Howse (2002) at 96. 
 
30.  See Weiler (2002).  
 
31.  The classic argument for this is made by Sassen. See Sassen (2006) and 
(1996). 
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32.  The Marshall Plan was embraced only after the initial plan for Germany – the 
Morgenthau Plan – had been abandoned. Designed by then American 
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany was to be 
partitioned and reduced to an agrarian society, all in an effort to prevent it  
from ever again posing a military threat. Among other things, the plan called 
for removal or destruction of industrial equipment and the flooding of mines. 
But the plan was abandoned when it became clear that the plan was wreaking 
havoc on the German economy, specifically wiping out agricultural 
productivity. Sent in 1947 to investigate the situation, former President 
Hoover concluded that the only way to make the plan work would be to move 
or exterminate 25,000,000 people in Germany. The Morgenthau Plan was 
abandoned and the Marshall Plan – a pro-growth plan – put in its place. See 
Balabkins (1964). A recent and fuller history of the Marshall Plan is  
found in Behrman (2007). For a contemporary German assessment of the 
Marshall Plan, see Stern 
http://www.germany.info/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html. 
 
33.  As mentioned above, Kent Jones describes these institutions in their historical 
context in Jones (2004). 
 
34.  Deane (1978) at 2.  
 
35.  As discussed later, this unsettled the balance of power of the twentieth 
century. 
 
36.  For an extensive outline of the changes international trade has brought to the 
apparel industry, see Gereffi (2001). 
 
37.  Reinert (2007) observes that mere “openness” of an economy (i.e., unbridled 
comparative advantage) is positively dangerous. He writes: 
 
From the unification of Italy in the nineteenth century to the integration of 
Mongolia and Peru in the 1990s, historical experience has shown that free 
trade between nations at very different levels of development tends to destroy 
the most efficient industries in the least efficient countries. I have referred to 
this common phenomenon as the Vanik-Reinert effect. It was seen in France 
after the Napoleonic War, during the unification of Italy and – during the end 
of history – both in the Second and Third World. The first thing to die is 
advanced manufacturing, the last thing to die out is subsistence agriculture, 
the least advanced. The sequence is 1) deindustrialization, 2) de-
agriculturalization, 3) depopulation. This phenomenon can be observed in 
many countries, for example in the south of Mexico and in Moldova in the 
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European periphery, where only the population over sixty and under fourteen 
stay behind while those in the working age bracket are working abroad. 
 
Ibid at 251. In a critical review of Reinert’s book, Paul Collier praises what he 
describes as Reinert’s “core idea,” that “manufacturing industry offers much 
better long-term prospects of development than either agriculture or natural 
resource extraction.” Collier (2007b) at 44. Collier chides Reinert for the 
latter’s failure to analyze “the recent manufacturing successes of developing  
countries in global markets.” Ibid. at 45. Although he does not make this 
point, it is fair to say that in his critique, Collier demonstrates that the issue in 
trade theory is not comparative advantage versus protectionism. Rather, it is 
engendering growth in underdeveloped countries in ways that enable those 
countries to enjoy the benefits of global trade. We read Collier as an advocate 
of what might be called “Enlightened Comparative Advantage” or 
“Comparative Advantage for the 21st Century.” To the same effect is Ha-Joon 
Chang’s recent book on the problems facing developing nations. Like Collier, 
Chang is critical of developing nations’ over-reliance on natural resources as 
a source of wealth. With respect to manufacturing, Chang writes: “History 
has repeatedly shown that the single most important thing that distinguishes 
rich countries from poor ones is basically their higher capabilities in 
manufacturing, where productivity is generally higher, and, more importantly, 
where productivity tends to (although does not always) grow faster than in 
agriculture or services.” Chang (2007) at 213. 
 
38.  As Elkington and Lee (2005) point out, the United States and other Western 
powers have advocated free trade and open markets at the same time as they 
have increasingly complained about the emerging powers’ access to their own 
economy. We would characterize this approach as reflective of the post-
modern reluctance of Western powers to extend a modern framework of free  
trade, but in any events, as we point out, it is difficult for the West to sell such 
concepts as “sustainable developments” to emerging economies like China. 
 
39.  See Weiler (2002).  
 
40.  See Marchak (1991). In this book, Marchak makes a now familiar argument 
that unrestrained global capitalism, which she associates with the “New 
Right,” has created an unregulated mix of new markets, labor supplies and 
resources, which has benefited corporate interests and left masses in dire 
conditions. The catchy phrase that Marchak coined – “Integrated Circus” – is 
intended to capture the unbridled aspect of the jungle capitalism that the 
author argues has come to dominate the global market. Marchak takes on 
various institutions, including the IMF and the GATT, to argue that 
globalized trade and conservative policies have resulted in an unmanageable 
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global commons.  A recent and fuller history of globalization through the lens 
of finance can be found in Stiglitz (2003).  We disagree with the over-used 
political polemic and the rather dogmatic assault on policies traditionally 
associated with the right wing of the political spectrum, but we agree with  
Marchak’s view of the global marketplace as having transformed itself 
without overhauling its normative or institutional setting. 
 
41.  The IMF has convened a forum for a select group of countries to promote 
dialogue on and, eventually, a common solution to deal with deficits in 
budgets and their impact on global financial stability. Delegates include the 
United States, China, the Euro Area, Japan, and Saudi Arabia all of whom 
were selected because of their likely ability to reduce the imbalance while 
sustaining increased world economic growth. While the parties invited to 
participate are eager to effect change, the IMF is having trouble incentivizing 
countries to cut deficits through trade measures. For more on the development 
of this body, see Robinson (2007). 
 
42.  See Wan (2001) at 22–70 and 186–204 (Wan argues that Japan competed 
with the United States on the economic level, at the same as it provided 
essential political collaboration and shored up the modern liberal democratic 
alliance on both the political and the economic level); See Horsley and 
Buckley (1990) for a general narrative of Japan’s economic achievements 
since World War II. 
 
43.  China’s trade surplus passed $100 billion in 2005, See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4602126.stm; The US-China Business 
Council reports a trade surplus of $178 billion in 2006. See 
http://www.uschina.org/info/forecast/2007/trade-performance.html. 
 
44.  See Corsi (2006) (reporting these numbers and noting that “[p]rior to 
Thanksgiving 2006, China’s central banks suggested a possible move to 
diversify foreign exchange holdings away from the dollar. As a consequence, 
the dollar sold off on world currency markets, hitting a new 20-month low 
against the Euro, a currency which is beginning to compete with the dollar as 
an international foreign reserve currency”); D’Amato, Hon. C. Richard 
(2005), testimony available online at 
http://www.uscc.gov/testimoniesspeeches/testimonies/2005/05 07 13 testi 
damato.php; Capital Markets Transparency and Security: The Nexus Between 
U.S.-China Security Relations and America’s Capital Markets, U.S. – China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, available online at 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000 2003/reports/cpmkex.php. 
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45.  In addition, the success of industries such as textiles in China can lead to a 
backlash from competitors in Western states. The U.S. textiles industry, for 
example, has often lobbied for measures limiting access by Chinese-made 
garment to American markets. See, e.g., Becker (2004). 
 
46.  See Rehn (2006) (address by former member of the European Commission 
emphasizing that the future of Europe lies in its enlargement to, among other 
territories, Southeastern Europe, and Turkey). 
 
47.  See Mandelson (2003) (speech before the European Parliament Trade 
Committee arguing that at the credibility of the WTO as a multilateral 
organization is at stake in the Doha round, that Doha’s success depends in 
large part on integrating developing countries in world markets and 
emphasizing the need to solve some of their pressing problems, such as 
access to affordable drugs). See also Cendrowicz (2005). 
 
48.  We have drawn the concept of “excluded” or exclus from the French context, 
where it has come to symbolize a socio-economic group that does not 
integrate into the economic and social framework where most subjects of the 
State find themselves. The question is intricately linked to the question of 
ethnicity and the lack of integration of North and sub-Saharan African 
immigrant communities in France. In Jennings (2000) at 575–585, the author 
explores whether traditional republican principles might be reconciled with a 
recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity. There are several schools of 
thought in France, which distinguish themselves from one another by the 
extent to which France should accept multicultural diversity or insist on 
conformity. Regardless of the extent to which  prejudice and lack of 
successful policies of integration contribute to the calcification of the 
excluded classes, the traditional French resistance to reforming modern 
welfare policies that have run their course and result in a rigid job market and 
relative lack of economic opportunity is a primary cause of the phenomenon.  
 
49.  The situation of the excluded in France is dire. One astute commentator 
describes it this way: 
 
Millions of young people remain trapped in the unemployment and 
underemployment ghetto. Hundreds of thousands of youth of North African 
descent, especially young women, have never had the chance to work. The 
victims of the expensive system of “solidarity” which protects older,            
“Frencher” workers, these abandoned youth are also the scapegoat of the far 
Right, which portrays them as leeches on the public purse. The reality is that 
immigrants receive very little social spending – with two clear exceptions, 
derelict public housing which can hardly be considered a great social gain, 
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and the RMI (“welfare”) payment. The lion’s share of social spending, 
however, goes to pensions and health care, not to the “welfare” or housing 
costs associated with the immigrant unemployed. Still, the majority of public 
housing units are indeed occupied by non-French-born citizens and non-
citizens, and this is a powerful image in the minds of Le Pen supporters. 
Smith (2004) at 176–177. 
 
50.  In its Policy Paper, the Atlantic Council also recommends convening a 
conference “aimed at restructuring the existing institutional architecture” of 
global trade. Atlantic Council (2007) at 3. 
 
51.  Global enablement of economic opportunity – is nascent, and its adoption on 
a global scale is in no way guaranteed. The arguments in this chapter serve to 
explain why we think this emerging norm should be nurtured and how the 
new institution of global trade will engender the growth and development of 
this norm. 
 
52.  See also www.kiva.org, an organization that facilitates loans between private 
citizens and small businesses in the developing world. Private lending to the 
third world is also described in Williamson (2007). 
 
53.  From a telephone interview with Adam Smith, Editor-in-Chief of 
nobelprize.org, on October 13, 2006, immediately following the 
announcement that Professor Yunus was to receive the 2006 Nobel Peace 
Price. This interview can be accessed http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace 
/laureates/2006/yunus-interview.html. Microcredit is so popular that even 
Hollywood and royalty are taking part. See Wighton (2007). 
 
54.  See Struggling Members Programme, Grameen Bank website, 
http://www.grameeninfo.org/bank/BeggerProgram.html. 
 
55.  For a guide to proposed legislation in the 110th Congress of the United States, 
see Solving Global Warming: Your Guide to Legislation, Natural Resource 
Defense Council, available online at  
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/factsheets/leg 07032601A.pdf (last visited 
August 13, 2007); Paulus-Jagriˇc (2007). 
 
56.  The examples adduced by Rodgers (2006) illustrated the basic claim that 
corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social 
development because it undermines the rule of law and the institutions 
fostering growth. 
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57.  Soriano describes the desperate conditions inside the maquiladoras, which are 
matched with wages ranging from $3.50–$5 a day. Workers are placed in 
dangerous conditions, experience sexual harassment, and are often exposed to 
toxic chemicals. Still, the workers hope for increased and fair wages that can 
ensure them more than minimal survival. See Soriano (1999); Although 
maquiladora workers along border towns collect higher wages than people 
working south of the cities, it is still not enough to cover the higher cost of 
living at the border. Bacon interviews a maquiladora worker who attests that 
his wages are not enough to sustain his family, and barely enough to put food 
on the table. Further, Bacon reveals the dirty sweatshops to be sites of toxic 
exposure. See Bacon (1997). 
 
58.  About.com, 2007, Maquiladors in Mexico, 
http://geography.about.com/od/urbaneconomicgeography/a/maquiladoras.htm 
(reporting that the number of maquiladora workers has doubled since the 
1990s and continues to grow and while foreign companies thrive and continue 
to raise more sweatshops along border towns, poor conditions inside many of 
the maquiladoras remain stagnant and without meaningful improvement). 
 
59.  Brown et al. (2005) at 4–15, outline the growth and history of regional trade 
agreements, citing instances where they have contributed to economic 
prosperity and stability as well as scenarios where individual member states 
have been adversely affected by the entry into force of an RTA. 
 
60.  See McGinnis and Movesian (2004) at 353–365 (arguing that proposals for 
transfer of additional power to WTO to regulate substantively in areas such as 
labor or the environmental standards would create an unworkable “global 
government” and that the WTO should confine itself to its central task of 
reducing barriers to trade).  
 
61.   Professor Weiler explored the evolution and formation of the European 
Union, and the relationship of the greater whole to the individual states. 
Weiler developed a powerful theory and axiom of international law holding 
that the less “Exit” states have the more “Voice” they will require in the 
formation of international law.  Weiler illustrates this theory in the context of 
the European Union, showing how the Luxembourg Crisis of the mid-1960s 
was linked to Member State (France in particular) surprise at the extent to 
which the European Court of Justice “constitutionalized” European law, 
giving it direct effect and supremacy. Together with the Treaty framework 
giving individuals access to national courts for cases arising under European        
law, the European Court jurisprudence gave European law a presence within 
the European legal fabric akin to national law in a federated state, and, to a 
substantial extent, deprived the Member States of the ability to exit the 
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European system. See Weiler (2005) at 2403. See also Cass (2005) (critiquing 
main conceptual paradigms for understanding the WTO: institutional 
managerialism (represented by J. H. H. Jackson), rights-based 
constitutionalization (represented by E.-U. Petersmann) and judicial norm-
generation (represented by Weiler); and arguing that the WTO system is not 
constitutional in nature and should take into account to a greater extent the 
uneven playing field and the economic development needs of states in order 
to achieve democratic legitimacy). See Petersmann (2000), (arguing that 
WTO should adopt human and civil rights as core constitutional values, in 
additional to economic rights). 
 
62.  The examples adduced by Rodgers (2006) illustrated the basic claim that 
corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and social 
development because it undermines the rule of law and the institutions 
fostering growth. 
 
63.  See Wan (2001) at 22–70 and 186–204 (Wan argues that Japan competed 
with the United States on the economic level, at the same as it provided 
essential political collaboration and shored up the modern liberal democratic 
alliance on both the political and the economic level); See Horsley and 
Buckley (1990) for a general narrative of Japan’s economic achievements 
since World War II. 
 
64.  See Agnew and Entrikin (2004) at 2 (the joint effect of the massive infusion 
of US aid to Europe and the implicit acceptance of open trade and investment 
were essential factors contributing to  the Western European choice of a 
modern liberal democratic alliance with the United States). 
 
65.  For a guide to proposed legislation in the 110th Congress of the United 
States, see Solving Global Warming: Your Guide to Legislation, Natural 
Resource Defense Council, available online at 
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/factsheets/leg 07032601A.pdf (last visited 
August 13, 2007); Paulus-Jagriˇc (2007). 
 
66.  In international investment, for example, states used principally “gunboat 
diplomacy” to resolve conflicts during the mercantilist era. This resulted in a 
Darwinian playing field where imperial and other strong states would impose 
their will on weaker states. In that world, as La Fontaine would say, “la 
raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure.” (the reason of the strongest is 
always the better). The “Calvo Doctrine” (named after the Argentinean jurist 
Carlos Calvo, the idea is that the location of an investment decides the 
jurisdictional question for dispute resolution) was, in part, a reaction to the 
power-driven structure of the global trading order. That school of thought 
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provided that each state (in particular a developing country) was free to 
impose its own rules, implemented through its own institutions, free of 
interference from foreign states. While the Calvo Doctrine rejected 
international institutions as legitimate law-makers and dispute resolution fora, 
it departed from the model of dispute resolution through force. See Cook 
(2007) at 1087–1089. See also Lekachman (1959) at 43 for discussion of the 
mercantilists’ zero-sum view of the world. 
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